Abstract-One way tu combat f z P file sharing of copyrighted content is to deposit into the file sharing systems large volumes of polluted files. Without taking sides in the file sharing debate, in this paper we undertake a measurement study af the nature and magnitude of pollution in the FastTrack P2P network, currently the most popular PZP file sharing system. We develop a crawling platform which crawls the majority of the FastTrack Network's 20,000+ supernodes in less than 60 minutes, From the raw data gathered by the crawler for popular audio content, we obtain statistics on the number of unique versions and copies available in a 24-hour period. We develop an automated procedure tu detect whether a given version is polluted or not, and we show that the probabilities of false positives and negatives of the detection procedure are very small.
I. INTRODUCTION
By many measures, file sharing is the most important application in the Internet today. For example, on a typical day, the FastTrack P2P network -currently one of the most largest file-sharing network -has more than 3 million active users sharing over 5,000 terabytes of content, (the FastTrack Network includes KaZaA, KaZaA-lite, Grokster and iMesh nodes). On the University of Washington campus network in June 2002, KaZaA consumed approximately 37% of all TCP traffic, which was more than twice the Web traffic on the same campus at the same time [11.
But file sharing is not only having an important impact on Internet usage and traffic; it is also profoundly impacting sales in the music and video recording industries. For example, in a recent study, Forrester estimates that the music industry lost over $700 million in CD sales in 2003 due to illicit sharing of copyrighted songs in P2P file sharing systems [2] . Each week there are more than one billion downloads of music files, and over 60 million Americans have downloaded music [3] Because of the potential of huge financial losses, the
.
music industry has attempted to throttle P2P file sharing activity on three distinct fronts. First, it has taken many of the file-sharing companies to court for copyright infringement. Ths approach was successful in 2001. when the US courts effectively shut down the leading file sharing application. Napster, a US-based company with a centralized architecture for file location [5] . However, this approach has had little success at curtailing the FastTrack Network, for which it is more difficult to simply "pull the plug" due to its highly decentralized architecture and to its elusive international corporate structure. The second front has been to prosecute the individual users for copyright infringement, which by some estimates has decreased illicit file sharing by 20% However, file sharing remains rampant in the Internet, as it is difficult to prosecute millions of "small" users. particuIarly when they are scattered across the globe. The music industry's third front for throttling file sharing is to actually sabotage the P2P file sharing systems. This approach has received relatively little press to date but -as we shall demonstrate in this paper -is currently being deployed on a grand scale.
One sabotage techruque that is particularly prevalent today, is that of pollution. Here. a "pollution company" first tampers with copyrighted content with the intention of rendering the content unusable. it then deposits the tampered content in large volumes in the P2P network. Unable to distinguish polluted files from unpolluted files, unsuspecting users download the files into their own file-sharing folders, from which other users download the polluted files. In this manner, the polluted copies of a given song spread through the filesharing system, and the number of polluted copies can eventually exceed the number of clean copies of a given song. The goal of the pollution company is to trick users into frequently downloading polluted copies; users may then become frustrated and abandon M P file sharing.
In this paper we undertake a detailed measurement study of the nature and magnitude of pollution in the FastTrack Network, currently the most popular P2P file sharing system. We emphasize that the purpose of this paper is not to take sides on the P2P file-sharing debate nor to condone nor to condemn pollution. The goal instead is to understand P2P pollution, how pervasive it is currently in P2P networks, how quickly it spreads, and to identify measures for countering P2P pollution attacks. We will see that pollution is indeed pervasive, with more than 50% of the copies of many popular recent songs being polluted in the FastTrack Network today. Because P2P file sharing is having a major impact on Internet &traffic and usage. it is important to gain deep insights into P2P pollution, which is now a central part of fie P2P landscape. taking an older recording, whose copyright has expired, and changng its song title, aIbum title, and artist name to that of the targeted recentlyreleased recording. Thus, when a user requests the target recording, the user will mistakenly obtain a different recording. We emphasize that these pollution schemes currently work well because there is a lack of good media matching systems in P2P file sharing. We discuss more about strategies for countering pollution in Section VI.
We can also classify pollution as intentional and unintentional. A pollution company intentionally creates polluted versions of files, using the content and metadata pollution techniques described above. But users often accidentally create damaged files and inject them into P2P file sharing systems. For example, a user may "rip" a song from a CD, inadvertently truncate the song, and then make available the truncated song in the P2P filesharing system. Or a user may record the song from the radio and accidentally pick up the disk-jockey's voice at the beginning or end of the song. We refer to files whch have been inadvertently corrupted by user error as unintentional pollution. Finally, we remark that certain parfies sometimes make minor modifications in recordings which are hardly noticeable, For example, we have observed that to reduce a song's air time, a radio station may eliminate a long, repetitive tail of the song or even slightly accelerate its playback. A user can then record and distribute the slightly-tampered song in a P2P file sharing system. The songs investigated in tius study are listed in Table 1 . (In Section IV we explain why we chose these particular songs.)
THE FASTTRACK CRAWLING SYSTEM
To gather raw data about versions, copies, and pollution levels in P2P systems, we developed and deployed a farm of multi-threaded crawling nodes, which we call the The FastTrack Crawling Platform. This system crawls through virtually all of the 30,000+ FastTrack Network's supernodes in 15-60 minutes. Furthermore, it is scalable in that the crawling time is inversely proportional to the number of Linux boxes in the platform.
A crawling system was previously developed for the Gnutella P2P network [6] . Developing a crawling system for the FastTrack Network is significantly more challenging for two reasons. First, the. FastTrack Network is 10-100 times larger than Gnutella, both in terms of the number of peers and traffic. Second, and an unofficial copy of the KMD, rather than the KaZaA client (KMD) distributed by S h m a n . Each KaZaA-Lite client emulates Shaman's KMD and participates in the same KaZaA network.
Unlike Napster, the FastTrack Network is decentrdized and does not maintain an always-on, centralized index for tracking the location of files. As shown in Figure 1 , the FastTrack Network has two classes of peers, Ordinary Nodes (ONs) and Super Nodes (SNs). SNs have greater responsibilities and are typically more powerful than the ONs with respect to availability, Internet connection bandwidth and processing power.
When an ON launches the KaZaA application, the ON establishes a TCP connection with a SN, thereby becoming a "child" of that SN. The ON then uploads to the SN the metadata and ContentHashes for the files it is sharing. This allows the SN to maintain a local index which includes ContentHashes and file descriptors for all the files its children are sharing along with the corresponding IP addresses of the ONs holding the particular files. In this way, each SN becomes a mini Napster-like hub. But in contrast with Napster, a SN is not a dedicated server (or server farm); instead, it is a peer belonging to an individual user. As shown in Figure  1 , each SN also maintains long-lived TCP connections with other SNs, creating an overlay network among the SNs.
When a user wants to find files, the user's ON sends a query with keywords over the TCP connection to its SN. For each match in its local index, the SN returns the metadata and IP addresses corresponding to the match.
When a SN receives a query, it may flood the query over the overlay network to one or more of the SNs to which it is connected. 'A given query will in general visit a small subset of the SNs, and hence will obtain the metadata information of a small subset of dl the ONs.
As part of the signalling traffic, the FastTrack Network nodes frequently exchange with each other lists of supemodes. For example, when an ON SNs. When a peer A (ON or SN) receives a supernode refresh list from another peer B, peer A will typically purge some of the entries from its cache and add entries sent by peer E. By frequently exchanging supemode refresh lists, nodes maintain up-to-date lists of active SNs.
B. The K a M Crawling Pia forin Architecture
The FastTrack Crawling Platform is shown in Figure  2 . It consists of a process manager, a measurement database, and n crawIing nodes. At the core of the system are the n crawling nodes, each implemented in its own Linux box. In our current deployment, n = 10. Each crawling node runs four processes, with each process maintaining 40 threads. Thus with n = 10, the FastTrack Crawling Platform has 1,600 parallel threads. h c h thread partially emulates the client-side of the FastTrack Network connect and query protocol. (We used the results of an earlier reverse engineering project to design the syntax and semantics of the threads' messages [7] .) All of these Linux boxes are. located in Polytechnic campus in Brooklyn. It is also possible to run crawler experiments from multiple locations distributed throughout the world. However as our measurement results described in section 111-C show, we are crawling the vast majority of SNs from the one location itself. Thus a distributed approach is not necessary.
The crawling takes place in rounds of 30 seconds. In each round, each crawling thread operates as follows: 1) 'Ihe crawling thread is initialized with (2) the IP address of some candidate SN in the FastTrack Network, and (ii) a set of query strings. For a targeted song, each query string typically consists of the song title and artist name.
2) The crawling thread attempts to make a TCP connection with the candidate SN. If At the end of each hour, the FastTrack Crawling Platform starts from scratch, with the candidate set of SNs initialized with the confirmed set of SNs of the previous hour. For each experiment, we gather data for a 24-hour period.
We employ a simple optimization to accelerate the harvest rate of SN IP addresses, As discussed above, after connecting to a SN, a crawling thread sends a sequence of queries into the FastTrack Network. We include in h s sequence generic queries such as "mp3". For each response, the crawling system identifies the SN that originating the query response. The responses thus provide an additional source of IF' addresses, which are merged with the addresses currently in the global list of the process manager. 
C. Crawling Coverage
Recall that in each hour, the crawler attempts to visit as many SNs as possible; and at the beginning of each new hour, the crawling restarts. We claim that in any given hour, the crawler covers the vast majority of SNs that were present in the overlay at sometime during the hour. (Because SNs come and go, the crawler may miss a small fraction of the SNs that were present during the hour. The average lifetime of a SN is about 2.5 hours
We use two distinct measurement stuhes to justify this claim. In [7] , we determined the number of clients that are connected to a typical SN; we also recorded the total number of peers in the FastTrack Network at any given time, whch is provided through the JCMD. Dividing the total number of peers by the number of peers connected to a SN gives an estimate of the total number of SNs. We estimated that the number of SNs is about 20.000-30,000, depending on the time of day. We performed an extensive version analysis on the seven popular songs shown in Table I . This analysis is presented in Table II . In choosing the seven songs, we chose songs that were ranked highly in the music charts at the time of the experiment; we also sought a diversity of record labels. Otherwise, our choice was randomwe did not select and then reject any songs with any c1 priori knowledge of their version or pollution levels. For each of these seven songs, the FastTrack Crawling Platform determined the number of versions of the song available in the FastTrack Network and the number of copies available for each version. To accurately count the number of copies available for a version, for each copy discovered by the crawler, we record the following 4-tupks for the copy: (IP address, port number, user name, ContentHash). The number of copies is the total number of non-identical 4-tuples.
As shown in Table 11 , each of these songs has a huge number of versions, ranging from 8,000 to almost 50,000. The number of copies for these songs is also remarkably large, ranging from about 175.000 to about 1.8 million.
For each of these seven songs, we rank ordered its versions from the most popular to least popular version, where here the popularity of a version is defined in terms of number of its copies discovered in the network. Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the number of copies with respect to the rankordered version number. We see from Figure 5 that for each of these songs, more than 60% of the copies come from the top 100 versions and more than 75% of the copies come from the top 500 versions. For two of the songs, more that 90% of copies come from the top 500 versions.
We also plotted the corresponding PMF on a loglog scale in in Figure 6 , The linearity of the curves indicates that version popularity closely follows a Zipf distribution, that is, for a given song the popularity of a version is give by
where n is the popularity rank of a given version and J(77.) is the fraction of copies of that version discovered in the FastTrack Network. For each song we compute a factor by fitting the corresponding data on the log-log plot to a straight line by the least squares method. The CY factors for the seven songs are between 0.77 and 1.03 and are shown in ..................................................... Figure 7 provides the probability mass functions (PMFs) for the durations for the decodable versions. Note the presence of a significant number of polluted too-short and toolong versions for both songs.
Our pollution detection procedure never creates false positives, that is, it never declares a version to be polluted when it truly isn't. However, it is is possible that the procedure declares some files as clean (that is, as non-polluted) when they are actually polluted. This Can happen as follows.
It is possible that the polluting party actually took care to preserve the mpeg structure of the polluted file, Such a polluted file will decode perfectly and thus pass undetected through our pollution detection procedure. All meta-data pollution, as described in Section 11, wiIl go undetected.
We performed a statistical analysis to estimate the percentage of false negatives in our pollution detection procedure for the two songs "Hey Ya" and "Naughty Girl." For these songs, we put the versions in persistent storage and manually listened to all 324 versions of "Hey Ya" and all the 282 versions of "Naughty Girl" of the top 500 popular versions that were declared clean by our pollution detection procedure. For "Hey Ya", we found 5 content-polluted versions and 18 mebdata-polIuted versions, giving the fraction 0.07 of false negatives. For Naughty Girl, we found 12 contentpolluted versions and 11 meta-data versions, giving the fraction 0.08 of false negatives. Thus the pollution statistics reported in this paper are representative of the actual pollution levels in the FastTrack Network.
B. Pollution Results
We use two measures for pollution levels for a given song: the fraction of polluted versions, and the fraction of polluted copies. Figure 8 shows both of these measures for seven songs. The x-axis depicts the titles of the songs and on y-axis the fraction of polluted versions and copies. For example, for the song "Naughty Girl" among the top 100 most popular versions, 62% of the versions are polluted and 73% of the copies are polluted.
From Figure 8 we see that recent popular songs have extraordinarily high levels of pollution in the FastTrack Network. Why? Since pollution is high and widespread over a variety of recent popular songs, we can rule out accidental "defective ripping" by the users as responsible for the bulk of the pollution. We therefore conclude that the music industry is succeeding in generating high pollution levels for popular recent songs. It is remarkable that among the top 500 versions for each of the seven songs considered, the number of polluted versions lies in a range of 100-350.
We emphasize that the levels of pollution shown in the Figure 8 are lower bounds of the actual pollution levels in the network. Indeed, the presence of false negatives, which are versions which pass our decodability test for pollution as described in section V-A, biases the results. We estimate that after taking into account false negatives, the percentage of polluted versions will increase by a value in the range of 7% to 8% (this value comes from our estimation of false negatives in section It is also interesting to note that the the two songs which respectively have the highest and lowest levels of pollution also have the highest and lowest number of copies. Specifically, "Ocean Avenue" with the least numbers of versions and copies also has the lowest pollution level. On the other hand, "My Band", with the highest number of versions and copies, has the highest pollution levels. This correlation is also present to a large extent in the five other songs. This correlation is likely because the songs with the most versions are the most popular -and hence potentially the most profitable for the music industry. Since the music industry wants to maintain its profits, it more aggressively pollutes the more popular songs.
Also, if an attempt is made to attack a particular song by depositing one or more polluted versions into V-A). Fraction of versions and copies found. bo be polluted for the network, then it is only worthwhile to do so if the number of copies of these polluted versions is substantial. For this reason, the fraction of polluted copies in the top 100 versions typically exceeds the fraction of polluted versions in the top 500 versions.
To gain insight on what types of songs are highly polluted, we repeated the entire crawling experiment for five older songs (all of which were chart hits in the 70s). These five songs are listed in Table 111 . From Table I11 we first observe that these formerly popular songs have relatively few versions and copies, a result which is not unexpected. From Figure 9 , we see that the pollution levels for these songs are low, with three of the five songs having less than 2% polluted copies. The pollution levels of "Born to Run" and "Saturday in the Park" are somewhat higher, but still way below those of the currently popular songs. It is possible that most (or even all) of the pollution for these older songs is unintentional pollution.
C, Evolution of Pollution
We also studied the dynamics of content evolution, which, to our knowledge, has not been explored previously. Specifically, we tracked the total number of polluted and unpolluted copies available for the top 100 most popular versions of a given song over a period of 19 days. Due to space constraints, we present the results of this experiment for only two songs, "Hey Ya" and "Naughty Girl". These results are shown in figure 10 . We also performed a statistical analysis of this evolution data and found that although the total number of copies available (polluted and unpolluted) is very dynamic, the percentage of polluted copies is slowly varying. The average change in percentage of polluted copies in consecutive measurements is 0.7% for "Hey Ya" and a slightly higher value of 2.5% for "Naughty Girl". This can also be seen by observing that the shape of polluted copies curve closely follows the unpolluted copies curve, It suggests that the dynamics observed in the evolution of content are highly influenced by the change in the size of the network over the experiment duration.
D. Ratings and Pollulion
The KMD client gives users the ability to rate the integrity of the files that they are making available for sharing. Any file can be rated as:
Excellent: File has complete data and is of an Average: File has some of the claimed data and is Poor: Poor technical quality. Delete File: File may be virus infected or in general excellent technical quality of moderate technical quality.
should not be shared.
When a user receives responses for a search for a file, the user's KMD client aggregates, for each discovered version, the ratings of all the copies found for that version into one single rating. For example, during a search, if three copies are discovered for some version, and the ratings for the three versions are excellent, poor and null (no rating), the KMD presents to the user the aggregation of these three scores.
For each of the seven recent songs studied in this paper, we recorded the rating for each discovered copy. Table IV provides a summary of our findings. We see from this table that a small percentage of copies are rated for each song. Although the KMD provides incentives for users to rate files by awarding users more participation points whenever a rated file is uploaded [9] , the low percentage of rated files is surprising.
ms is most likely due to (2) the popularity of the KaZaA-lite client, which provides users with maximum participation levels by default, and (ii) lack of user awareness about the relationship between rating activity and participation points.
Table IV also presents statistics on the accuracy of the ratings for the seven songs. We say a copy of a version is falsely rated when it has been rated as good (excellent or average) when in-fact it is polluted. The third column of table IV presents the fraction of falsely rated copies for each song. We observe that this fraction is highly correlated with the actual pollution levels, given in Column 4 of the same table: The higher the fraction of falsely rated copies for a song, the higher is the corresponding pollution level. This leads us to conclude that pollution companies also falsely rate their polIuted copies.
It appears that even before users are able to rate out a polluted version, new polluted versions are introduced into the network. Frequently introducing polluted versions of a particular song is capable of defeating the content rating mechanism. KaZaA's content rating mechanism is meaningless in the face of an onslaught of polluted versions.
VI. ANTI-POLLUTION MECHANISMS
Given that pollution in p2P file sharing systems is pervasive, it is natural to consider what can be done to defend against the pollution attack, In this section we describe a number of potential anti-pollution mechanisms. We classify the mechanisms into two categories:
Detection without downloading: After receiving search results, the mechanism attempts to determine whether the files in the results are polluted without actually downloading any portion of the files. In any case, each of the fingerprinting schemes requires a trusted database, whch not only has a maintenance cost but could itself be the target of a legal attack.
User filtering: We conjecture that if most users first check their downloaded files before copying them into their shared folders, then the level of pollution in file sharing would be significantly reduced. Peers with such a behavior would be acting as sieves, downloading both polluted and unpolluted content but filtering out the former. The challenge here is to provide users a robust incentive scheme that encourages users to filter out polluted files.
have identified a number of subclasses:
Detection williuut file downloading
The mechanisms in this class rely on the experience of other peers with shared files. For these mechanisms, although a given peer does not need to explicitly download the content, the success of the mechanism depends on an appraisal of the content by other peers that have downloaded the content in the past. 
VII. RELATED WORK
There are a number of other P2P measurement studies, but most of these studies examine transmitted p2P traffic rather than stored P2P content (as in this paper). In these traffic studies, traffic is collected at a link interface (for example at the boundary of a campus network) and then processed off-line. [15] talks about P2P application specific signatures; these signature techniques could be deployed by an ISP to identify and filter illicit P2P traffic. [16] analyzes P2P traffic by measuring Aow-level information collected at multiple border routers across a large ISP-network. By measuring KaZaA traffic in the University of Washington campus,
[I] studies file-sharing workloads and develops models for multimedia workload. A crawling system was previously developed for the Gnutella P2P network [6] + Developing a crawling system for the FastTrack Network is significantly more challenging for two reasons. First, the FastTrack Network is 10-100 times larger than Gnutella, both in terms of the number of peers and traffic. Second, and more importantly, the Gnutella protocol is in the public domain, whereas the FastTrack Network protocol is proprietary with little information available to the research community about how it operates. See also [17] for some additional work on crawling Gnutella and Napster.
There has been some recent measurement work on spread of spyware in networked systems. In 1181 the authors develop signatures for popular spyware and obtain traces of network activity within the University of Washington campus to quantify the spreading of these programs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We examined the nature and extent of pollution in P2P file sharing. We found that popular contemporary songs can have a remarkably large number of different versions, as many as 50,000. There are also huge numbers of copies of popular songs, often over 1 million. We found that pollution is indeed pervasive in file sharing, with more than 50% of the copies of many popuIar recent songs being polluted in the FastTrack Network today. Our results indicate that the vast majority of tlus pollution is intentional. For older songs, pollution is less prevalent and may mostly consist of unintentional pollution. We have also tracked the evolution of copies in the FastTrack Network and have found that pollution levels remained roughly constant over a 19-day period.
We also found that KaZaA's rating system is largely ineffective at identifying polluted copies, We identified and reviewed a number of potential anti-pollution mech-
